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In Brief
Guterstam et al. used an out-of-body
illusion to perceptually teleport subjects
during fMRI. Self-location could be
decoded from parieto-cingulate-
hippocampal activity; posterior cingulate
activity reflected integration of self-
location and body ownership, suggesting
a key role in the coherent experience of
the bodily self in space
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The senses of owning a body and being localized
somewhere in space are two key components of hu-
man self-consciousness. Despite a wealth of neuro-
physiological and neuroimaging research on the
representations of the spatial environment in the pa-
rietal and medial temporal cortices, the relationship
between body ownership and self-location remains
unexplored. To investigate this relationship, we
used a multisensory out-of-body illusion to manipu-
late healthy participants’ perceived self-location,
head direction, and sense of body ownership during
high-resolution fMRI. Activity patterns in the hippo-
campus and the posterior cingulate, retrosplenial,
and intraparietal cortices reflected the sense of
self-location, whereas the sense of body ownership
was associated with premotor-intraparietal activity.
The functional interplay between these two sets of
areas was mediated by the posterior cingulate cor-
tex. These results extend our understanding of the
role of the posterior parietal and medial temporal
cortices in spatial cognition by demonstrating that
these areas not only are important for ecological be-
haviors, such as navigation and perspective taking,
but also support the perceptual representation of
the bodily self in space. Our results further suggest
that the posterior cingulate cortex has a key role in
integrating the neural representations of self-location
and body ownership.
INTRODUCTION
We experience our body as a physical entity with a specific loca-
tion in the external space. For instance, when sitting at your
desk, you are aware of your body and its approximate position
with respect to objects and the spatial boundaries of the room
[1]. This sense is essential for our interactions with the outside
world [2] and has long been regarded among philosophers and
psychologists as a fundamental aspect of self-consciousness
[3, 4]. Recently, neuroscientists have started to explore its neural
correlates and have highlighted two factors, implemented in
partially distinct neural substrates, as key to bodily self-con-
sciousness: the feeling that the body is part of the self (body1416 Current Biology 25, 1416–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltownership) and the experience that the body is located some-
where in space (self-location) [5–7]. This view is supported by
the existence of neurological impairments that specifically affect
the sense of body ownership or the sense of self-location. For
instance, patients suffering from asomatognosia fail to recognize
their own limbs as part of the self [8], whereas focal epilepsy and
electrical stimulation of the temporal and parietal cortices can
sometimes induce out-of-body experiences (OBEs), in which
the perceived self-location is temporarily detached from the pa-
tient’s physical body [9–11]. Although the existence of these
conditions suggests that body ownership and self-location
require intact neural processing in fronto-parietal and temporo-
parietal areas, respectively, their underlying mechanisms and
their relationship remain poorly understood.
Recent studies using perceptual illusions in healthy partici-
pants have demonstrated thatmultisensory integration of signals
from the body viewed from the first-person visual perspective
(1PP) is a key mechanism for the emergence of body ownership
[12, 13]. The illusory experience that an artificial hand [14] or an
entire body [13] is one’s own is associatedwith increased activity
in the premotor-intraparietal regions [13, 15]. These areas inte-
grate visual, tactile, and proprioceptive information and contain
neurons with visuo-tactile receptive fields anchored to a portion
of the body surface and its surrounding (peripersonal) space [16,
17]. Neuronal populations in these areas construct multisensory
representations of the boundaries of one’s body and are ideally
suited to support the feeling of body ownership [7, 18, 19].
Conversely, theories regarding the neural mechanisms underly-
ing the sense of self-location draw primarily from the study of
spatial navigation in rodents and virtual navigation in humans.
Abundant evidence from such studies indicates that the medial
temporal and posterior parietal cortices are involved in the con-
struction of internal representations of an individual’s spatial
location [20–22] and head direction [23–27]. However, it remains
unclear how these representations relate to the perceptual expe-
rience of self-location and the representation of one’s own body.
In light of the above, we set out to investigate the neural repre-
sentations of self-location and body ownership and their func-
tional interplay. We manipulated these factors by making use
of a perceptual out-of-body illusion [12]. In the original experi-
ment, the participants sit on a chair and wear a set of head-
mounted displays (HMDs) through which they observe the real-
time 3D video feed from a pair of cameras located 2 m behind
them. The experimenter then synchronously touches the partic-
ipant’s chest, which is hidden from view, and the space just
below the cameras with two identical small objects. This mode
of visuo-tactile stimulation leads to the illusory experience ofd All rights reserved
Figure 1. Experimental Setup
The participants were positioned inside an MRI scanner and looked into a set of HMDs. The upper panels show a schematic map of the scanner room indicating
the participants’ physical self-location (black), as well as the illusory self-location (white) for positions A, B, and C. The lower panels show one sample frame from
the stereoscopic visual stimuli presented to the participants in the HMDs (only the left eye’s image is shown here) for each position. In the HMDs, the participants
viewed their real body (from the third-person perspective [3PP]) lying in the scanner and the stranger’s body (from the 1PP) being touched by a white spherical
object, while receiving synchronous (illusion condition) or asynchronous (control) tactile stimulation. 1PP, first-person perspective. See also Figure S1 and
Movie S1.being physically located at the position of the cameras and that
the observed real body is no longer part of the self [12, 28].
Crucially, the delivery of asynchronous touches significantly re-
duces the illusion and allows for the comparison of otherwise
equivalent conditions [12, 28]. Here, we adapted the out-of-
body illusion to a supine, head-tilted posture inside a MRI scan-
ner. This experimental setup allowed us to manipulate the sense
of body ownership and study self-location by perceptually ‘‘tele-
porting’’ the participants between locations within the real-world
scanner environment while recording brain activity using high-
resolution fMRI (see the Experimental Procedures).
Fifteen healthy participants were positioned inside an MRI
scanner with their head tilted forward while wearing HMDs.
Through the displays, they viewed the scanner room and them-
selves in stereoscopic vision from the perspective of a stranger
lying on the floor in one of three positions: positions A, B, and
C (Figures 1 and S1). Positions A and B corresponded to two
different corners of the room with identical head directions,
whereas positions B and C represented perpendicular head di-
rections in the same corner. To elicit the illusion of owning the
stranger’s body seen from the 1PP and being physically located
in position A, B, or C, the experimenter applied synchronous
touches to the participant’s body and the corresponding location
on the stranger’s body (Figure 1 and Movie S1) [12, 13]. The
touches delivered to the real body were hidden from the partic-
ipants’ view in the HMDs (see the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures for details). For each position, we also included a
control condition in which the touches occurred asynchronously
to reduce the illusion.
This experimental design allowed us to test for changes in
brain activity that reflect alterations in the feelings of body owner-Current Biology 25, 14ship, self-location, and the functional interplay between owner-
ship and self-location. We conducted three main analyses. First,
we estimated the main effect of visuo-tactile synchrony across
positions to examine the activity related to the feeling of owner-
ship of the stranger’s body viewed from the 1PP [13, 15].
Second, to identify the neural substrates of the perceived self-
location, we used multivoxel pattern analysis [29] to decode
position A versus B (for perceived head direction, we decoded
position B versus C) in the synchronous condition, using the
asynchronous condition as a control for illusion non-specific ef-
fects. Finally, we investigated the neural interplay between the
representations of body ownership and self-location by exam-
ining the illusion-induced changes in effective connectivity be-
tween the corresponding sets of brain regions.
RESULTS
Illusion Quantification—Behavioral and
Psychophysiological Results
Before examining the fMRI results related to the illusion experi-
ence, we tested the efficacy of the experimental manipulation
of body ownership and self-location [12, 28]. To this end, we
conducted three behavioral experiments in parallel with, or
immediately after, the brain-scanning sessions and quantified
subjective and objective changes in the perceived self-location
and body ownership. In a post-scan self-location task (see the
Experimental Procedures and Figure S2A), we presented the
participants with a map of the scanner room and asked them
to rate how strongly they perceived themselves to be located
in different candidate positions [28]. The results showed that
the synchronous, as opposed to the asynchronous, condition16–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1417
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Figure 2. Behavioral Results
(A) The results of the post-scan self-location task revealed that the synchronous condition was associated with a strong sense of self-location in the out-of-body
positions and a weak sense of self-location inside the scanner.
(B) Participants consistently rated statements reflecting the illusion experience, but not the control statements, as significantly higher for the synchronous, but not
for the asynchronous, condition. See also Figure S2B for the ratings of each individual statement.
(C) Sample frames depicting the three different threat events.
(D) The SCR evoked by a knife, but not a spoon, threatening the stranger’s body was significantly higher in the synchronous compared to the asynchronous
condition.
Error bars indicate the SEM. See also Movie S1.was associated with a strong and unambiguous sense of self-
location in the out-of-body position and a weak sense of self-
location in the veridical position inside the scanner (p = 0.010;
Figure 2A). A separate post-scan questionnaire experiment
confirmed that the participants vividly experienced ownership
of the stranger’s body in the out-of-body position (A, B, or C) dur-
ing the synchronous, but not during the asynchronous, condition
(p < 0.001; Figure 2B; see Figure S2B for the questionnaire
statements).
Concurrently with the brain scanning, we examined the skin
conductance response (SCR) evoked by physical threats
directed toward the stranger’s body and the real body (Figure 2C
andMovie S1). Previous studies have shown that such SCRs can
be used as an objective physiological proxy of body ownership
[12, 28, 30]. In line with the subjective reports, we found that1418 Current Biology 25, 1416–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltthreatening the stranger’s body with a knife elicited a signifi-
cantly greater SCR in the synchronous compared to the asyn-
chronous condition. Importantly, this was not the case when
the knife was substituted with a neutral object such as a spoon
(p = 0.002, interaction effect; Figure 2D). Moreover, we examined
the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) responses evoked
by these threats in brain regions involved in the experience of
fear and pain anticipation, as well as the SCR and BOLD re-
sponses to threats directed toward the real body, providing
further psycho- and neurophysiological support for successful
induction of the illusion (Figure S3).
Taken together, these behavioral, psychophysiological, and
threat-evoked BOLD results are consistent with the notion that
the illusion experience is dependent on temporally congruent vi-
suo-tactile stimulation and involves ownership of the stranger’sd All rights reserved
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Figure 3. Body Ownership-Related Brain Responses
(A) The main effect owning the stranger’s body viewed from the 1PP (synchronous versus asynchronous across positions) revealed significant activations in the
premotor and posterior parietal areas related tomultisensory integration of visual, tactile, and proprioceptive signals from the body. PMd, dorsal premotor cortex;
PMv, ventral premotor cortex; IPS, intraparietal sulcus; LOC, lateral occipital cortex.
(B) The key activations in the PMd and PMv and the cortex lining the IPS were driven by a consistent synchronous versus asynchronous difference across the
positions (see also Figure S3 for the threat-evoked fMRI activations). Error bars indicate the SEM.
(C) The level of activity in the left PMv reflected the subjectively rated strength of the feeling of ownership of the body seen from the 1PP across the three different
positions.
For display purposes, the statistical threshold for the activation maps was set to p < 0.005, uncorrected. In (B) and (C), a white circle indicates a cluster containing
a significant peak (p < 0.05, corrected).body seen from the 1PP and a clear sense of self-location in the
out-of-body positions. These findings support the feasibility of
our approach of using this perceptual illusion to manipulate the
senses of body ownership and self-location during fMRI.
Body Ownership-Related Brain Responses
Next, we characterized the BOLD responses associated with the
feeling of ownership of the stranger’s body viewed from the 1PP
by computing the main effect of visuo-tactile synchrony across
positions (see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures).
This analysis revealed activations in key multisensory areas in
the left premotor (ventral, t = 3.11, p = 0.037; dorsal, t = 4.17,
p = 0.002, corrected) and bilateral intraparietal cortices (left, t =
4.40, p = 0.001; right, t = 3.37, p = 0.019, corrected) that have
previously been associated with the feeling of ownership of an
entire artificial body viewed from the 1PP [13] (Figures 3A and
3B). In addition, we reproduced a significant positive relationship
between the level of activity in the left ventral premotor cortex
and the subjectively rated strength of ownership of the stranger’s
body [13, 15] (t = 4.33, p = 0.038, corrected; Figure 3C), confirm-
ing that activity in this region reflects changes in the subjective
feeling of body ownership. Finally, we found increased activity
in the bilateral lateral occipital cortices (tentative ‘‘extrastriate
body area’’; see Figure 3A and Table S1), which are known to
be involved in the visual processing of body parts [31] and
have been consistently observed in previous fMRI studies of
limb [15] and whole-body ownership [13] (see the SupplementalCurrent Biology 25, 14Discussion). Together, these findings support the hypothesis
that activity in the multisensory premotor-intraparietal cortices
is associated with the feeling of ownership of a body seen from
the 1PP in a real-world environment.
Decoding Self-Location and Head Direction
To identify brain regions involved in the processing of perceived
self-location and head direction, we employed multivoxel
pattern analysis [29]. First, we sought evidence for patterns of
neural activity that carry information concerning the perceived
self-location (position A versus B) in the synchronous and asyn-
chronous conditions. To control for effects that were unrelated
to the illusion, such as differences in the 1PP visual input be-
tween the positions, we only looked for regions that decoded
position A versus B significantly better in the synchronous
compared to the asynchronous condition, as well as compared
to the chance level (50%; using an inclusive mask thresholded at
p < 0.001, uncorrected; see the Supplemental Experimental Pro-
cedures). We hypothesized that the hippocampus, posterior
midline areas, such as the posterior cingulate (PCC) and retro-
splenial cortices (RSC), and intraparietal cortex would be
involved in representing the perceived self-location. The hippo-
campus features place cells that encode a rat’s allocentric
spatial location [20, 32], and human fMRI studies have shown
that goal locations in virtual environments can be decoded
from this structure [22]. The intraparietal cortex contains
egocentric maps of somatosensory and visual space [33–35]16–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1419
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Figure 4. Decoding Self-Location and Head Direction
(A) The perceived self-location could be significantly decoded from patterns of BOLD activity in the hippocampus (HC; see also Figure S4), PCC, cortices lining
the IPS, and supramarginal gyrus (SMG).
(B) The decoding accuracy was significantly related to the subjectively reported self-location score in the RSC, PCC, and IPS. D, synchronous versus asyn-
chronous difference.
(C) The perceived head direction could be significantly decoded from BOLD activity patterns in the IPS, precuneus, RSC, and PCC.
For display purposes, the statistical threshold for the activation maps was set to p < 0.005, uncorrected. A white circle indicates a cluster containing a significant
peak (p < 0.05, corrected). Error bars indicate SEM.and is activated during spatial navigation [21] and imagined
changes in the 1PP [36], whereas the PCC and RSC have
been implicated in the translation of egocentric-to-allocentric
representations of space [33, 34, 37]. Thus, this set of areas is
ideally suited to construct a multisensory representation of the
spatial location of one’s bodily self.
In keeping with our hypotheses, the results revealed signifi-
cant decoding of self-location in the left hippocampus (t =
7.46, p = 0.001, corrected), left posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC; t = 3.65, p = 0.041, corrected), and right IPS (t = 4.84,
p = 0.034, corrected) (see Figure 4A). The left hippocampal de-
coding peak was located on the border between the hippocam-
pus and the parahippocampal gyrus (PHG). The corresponding
cluster extended from the left posterior hippocampus into the
PHG. In a post hoc analysis, we manually segmented the hippo-
campus to qualitatively isolate the voxels belonging to the self-
location cluster that overlapped with the hippocampus proper.
This analysis confirmed the presence of voxels in the left poste-
rior hippocampus proper that significantly decoded self-location
(Montreal Neurological Institute [MNI]: 22, 30, 12; t = 4.96,1420 Current Biology 25, 1416–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltp = 0.006, corrected; Figures S4A and S4B). In addition, we
found decoding of self-location in the left supramarginal gyrus
of the left inferior parietal cortex at a reduced significance
threshold (SMG; t = 5.10, p < 0.001, uncorrected for multiple
comparisons; Figure 4A). Interestingly, the decoding accuracy
was positively correlated with the behavioral self-location score
in the left PCC (t = 4.00, p = 0.028, corrected), right IPS (t = 4.32,
p = 0.019, corrected), and left retrosplenial cortex (RSC; t = 6.21,
p = 0.002, corrected) (Figure 4B). This result suggests that activ-
ity patterns in these areas are tightly linked to the subjective
sense of self-location.
Second, we sought to identify brain regions involved in the
processing of the perceived head direction (position B versus
C). Single-cell recordings in navigating rats have revealed head
direction cells in the retrosplenial [38, 39] and entorhinal cortices
[40], and neuroimaging studies have shown that the posterior
midline and intraparietal cortices are involved in representing
imagined [41] and navigation-related [25, 26] directions in space.
Thus, we expected to find significant decoding in this set of
areas. In line with our hypotheses, the results showed that thed All rights reserved
Figure 5. The Neural Interplay between Self-Location and Body
Ownership
The graphs show areas that exhibit ownership-related increases in effective
connectivity to the PCC that are positively correlated with the PCC decoding
accuracy of self-location. The y axis represents changes in connectivity to the
PCC induced by the sense of owning the stranger’s body viewed from the 1PP
(synchronous versus asynchronous across positions), plotted against self-
location (position A versus B) decoding accuracy difference (D, synchronous
versus asynchronous). The results show that the neural representation of self-
location in the PCC is significantly associated with ownership-related changes
in connectivity strength between the PCC and the IPS, RSC, and hippocampus
(HC). For display purposes, the statistical threshold for the activation maps
was set to p < 0.005, uncorrected. A white circle indicates a cluster containing
a significant peak (p < 0.05, corrected). See also Figure S4.perceived head direction could be significantly decoded from
the right IPS (t = 3.56, p = 0.047, corrected), left precuneus (t =
3.74, p = 0.037, corrected), left RSC (t = 3.59, p = 0.045, cor-
rected), and right PCC (t = 4.80, p = 0.008, corrected) (Figure 4C).
Thus, fine-grained BOLD activity patterns in the intraparietal, ret-
rosplenial, and posterior cingulate cortices contain information
not only on the perceived self-location, but also on the perceived
directional heading.Current Biology 25, 14The Neural Interplay between Body Ownership
and Self-Location
Finally, we investigated the interplay between the neural repre-
sentations of body ownership and self-location in terms of the
illusion-induced changes in effective connectivity. In the process
of localizing one’s own body in the environment, the brain must
combine information concerning the representation of the
body—processed by multisensory areas identified in the premo-
tor-posterior-parietal cortices—with information concerning
self-location—encoded in the parieto-hippocampal circuits.
We hypothesized that the PCC and RSC play key roles in this
integrative process because they have strong anatomical con-
nections to both the intraparietal and medial temporal areas
[42] and compute transformations between body-centered and
allocentric spatial reference frames [33, 34, 37]. This notion is
compatible with our findings showing that activity patterns in
the left PCC contained information on self-location (Figure 4A)
and that the level of self-location information in the left PCC
was positively correlated with the subjectively rated self-location
score (Figure 4B). Based on these empirical and theoretical con-
siderations, we chose the left PCC decoding peak as our seed
region. We then searched for voxels that displayed ownership-
related increases in connectivity to the PCC that were positively
related to the PCC decoding accuracy of self-location. Specif-
ically, we performed a psychophysiological interaction (PPI)
analysis using the contrast synchronous versus asynchronous
across positions as the psychological factor, and searched for
voxels in which the PPI parameter estimate significantly co-var-
ied with the PCC decoding accuracy across subjects (see the
Supplemental Experimental Procedures for details). This anal-
ysis brings together the univariate general linear modeling
(GLM) findings related to the feeling of ownership of the body
seen from the 1PP (Figure 3) and the multivariate decoding re-
sults related to the representation of the perceived self-location.
As such, this effective connectivity analysis allowed us to
examine the interplay between the neural representations of
the body and the perceived self-location. The results showed
that participants with higher decoding accuracies of self-location
(position A versus B) in the left PCC showed proportionally stron-
ger effective connectivity to the left IPS (t = 4.38, p = 0.023,
corrected), right RSC (t = 4.46, p = 0.021, corrected), and left hip-
pocampus (t = 5.93, p = 0.003, corrected) (Figure 5). These find-
ings suggest that ownership of the stranger’s body viewed from
the 1PP is associated with an effective connectivity increase be-
tween the PCC and the intraparietal-retrosplenial-hippocampal
cortices that is intimately linked to the representation of self-
location in the PCC.
DISCUSSION
In summary, we have used a multisensory full-body illusion
involving advanced 3D virtual reality technology in combination
with fMRI brain-decodingmethods to investigate the relationship
between two fundamental components of self-consciousness
[5–7]: self-location and body ownership. Our results revealed
two novel main findings. First, we found that activity patterns in
the IPS, RSC, PCC, and hippocampus reflected the sense of
self-location. The illusion of self-location was contingent on the
feeling of ownership of the stranger’s body from whose16–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1421
perspective the participants observed the environment. This
sense of owning a body viewed from the 1PP was associated
with activity in the multisensory premotor-intraparietal cortices.
Second, our results suggest that the PCC orchestrates the
flow of information concerning bodily self-location between the
IPS and the hippocampus. These findings extend beyond previ-
ous neuroimaging studies that used full-body illusions [13, 43]
but did not investigate the interplay between body ownership
and self-location. Similarly, studies based on visual [24] or imag-
ined changes in the 1PP [25, 36] and spatial navigation [22] did
not examine whether the spatial representations under investi-
gation contribute to the perceptual experience of self-location
or interact with central representations of the body. The present
results thus extend our understanding of the role of the posterior
parietal and medial temporal cortices in spatial cognition by
demonstrating that these areas are not only important for
ecological behaviors, such as navigation and perspective-tak-
ing, but also support the perceptual representation of the bodily
self in space.
Consistent with earlier fMRI studies [13, 15, 44], we found that
the sense of owning the stranger’s body was associated with ac-
tivations in the left PMv, bilateral IPS, and LOC (for an in-depth
discussion, see the Supplemental Discussion). The intraparietal
and premotor cortices are convergence zones for visual, tactile,
and proprioceptive information from the body [17], and neuronal
populations in these regions continuously integrate multisensory
signals to maintain an accurate central representation of one’s
body in space [7, 44]. We assert that the premotor-intraparietal
activations observed in this study reflect the dynamic integration
of spatio-temporally congruent visual information from the
stranger’s body being touched and tactile and proprioceptive
signals, resulting in the coherent multisensory percept of the
stranger’s body being part of the self. This multisensory integra-
tive process could be accompanied by the remapping of periper-
sonal space from the ‘‘disowned’’ real body to center on the
stranger’s body viewed from the 1PP, in line with our threat-
evoked SCR results (Figures 2 and S3) and a previous study
demonstrating such remapping during a single-limb ownership
illusion [18]. Finally, we emphasize that our findings go beyond
earlier work on body illusions because they reveal a dynamic
interaction between fronto-parietal representations of body
ownership and parieto-cingulate-hippocampal representations
of self-location in the environment (see detailed discussion
below).
Our decoding analyses revealed that patterns of BOLD activity
in the posterior parietal cortex, PCC, and hippocampus reflect
the perceived spatial location of the bodily self. In the posterior
parietal cortex, information about self-location could be deci-
phered from activity patterns in the cortices lining the IPS (p <
0.05, corrected) and SMG (p < 0.001, uncorrected). The right
IPS is particularly interesting because its decoding accuracy
was positively related to the reported vividness of the place illu-
sion, suggesting that neural activity in this region reflects the
consciously perceived self-location. In the right IPS we also
found multivoxel patterns that carried information concerning
perceived head direction, and in the IPS bilaterally we observed
univariate activations reflecting the feeling of ownership of the
stranger’s body (see Figure S4E for a post hoc cluster overlap
analysis). Previous studies have shown that the IPS contains1422 Current Biology 25, 1416–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltneuronal populations that encode multimodal signals in various
body-centered spatial reference frames [17], including head-
centered coordinates [45], as well as retinotopic representations
of the visual field [33, 35]. Thus, the IPS is involved in the con-
struction of multisensory representations of the body and its
spatial context. These properties and the current results point
to the IPS as a good candidate to support an egocentric repre-
sentation of self-location. We propose that the place- and
head-direction-specific patterns detected in the right IPS reflect
the dynamic updating of an egocentric spatial reference frame
that is anchored to the perceived location and orientation of
one’s own body in space.
The decoding accuracy in the PCC and RSC also mirrored the
subjectively reported self-location score, indicating that these
regions may play key roles in supporting the sense of self-loca-
tion. Although relatively little is known about the cognitive func-
tions of the PCC, this region is a central node in the ‘‘default
mode network’’ and activity in this structure has been associated
with decision-making, attention, memory, face perception, and
spatial navigation [46–48]. The RSC (Brodmann areas 29 and
30), which together with the PCC (areas 23 and 31) constitutes
the ‘‘retrosplenial complex’’ [37], has also been implicated in
memory processing and navigation [38]. Interestingly, RSC le-
sions in humans impair the ability to represent one’s directional
heading with respect to environmental landmarks [49]. This is
compatible with our observation that the PCC and RSC elabo-
rate information on the perceived head direction. As previously
mentioned, the PCC and the RSC are anatomically intercon-
nected with the intraparietal cortex and medial temporal regions
[42] and are thought to mediate the translation between egocen-
tric and allocentric spatial representations [34, 38]. Our effective
connectivity analysis revealed illusion-specific changes in the
functional coupling between the PCC and nodes in the IPS,
RSC, and hippocampus that were positively correlated with the
information content concerning self-location in the PCC (also
see Figures S4C and S4D for effective connectivity results with
respect to head direction). This observation suggests that the
interplay between these brain areas reflects the coordinated pro-
cessing of information encompassing both the body and the
perceived self-location. Thus, these findings are compatible
with the notion that the PCC and the RSC work in concert with
the IPS and the hippocampus to represent the perceived spatial
location of the bodily self. We propose that the role of the PCC
and the RSC in this processmay consist of translating egocentric
intraparietal into allocentric hippocampal multisensory represen-
tations of self-location.
Studies on spatial memory have shown that the human brain
uses both egocentric and allocentric representations of space
and that regions in the medial temporal lobe contribute primarily
to the latter [34]. We found that BOLD activity patterns in the hip-
pocampus contained information concerning the perceived
spatial location of one’s bodily self. However, we found no evi-
dence of head direction decoding in this structure. In light of
this, we propose that the hippocampus supports an allocentric
representation of the perceived self-location and that—in line
with our effective connectivity results—this representation is inti-
mately linked to the egocentric representation of self-location in
the IPS via intermediate processing in the PCC. Population activ-
ity of hippocampal place cells form the likely neuronald All rights reserved
underpinning for the multivoxel patterns that we observed in this
region. These cells have been shown to represent the animal’s
position in allocentric spatial reference frames, at the level of
both neuronal spikes [20] and spatially distributed local field po-
tentials [50]. The proposed role of the hippocampus in construct-
ing an allocentric representation of self-location fits well with
earlier studies on spatial navigation and path integration, in
which the locations of the participants’ targets in virtual naviga-
tion tasks can be decoded from hippocampal activity patterns
[22]. Our results extend the understanding of the role of the hip-
pocampus in spatial cognition by demonstrating that hippocam-
pal activity patterns reflect the currently perceived self-location
and that multisensory integrative mechanisms related to body
ownership can update this representation even in the absence
of active navigation and path integration.
Our experimentally induced out-of-body illusion shares some
key characteristics with OBEs elicited by focal epilepsy and
electrical brain stimulation [9–11]. In both cases, the spatial loca-
tion of the self is perceived at an extracorporeal position with
respect to the real body viewed from a visual 3PP. In contrast
to the illusion, clinical OBEs are often related to changes in the
perceived location of the self with respect to the gravitational
field and various vestibular sensations such as floating and rota-
tion [11]. A previous neuroimaging study investigated the inter-
action between self-location and the perceived direction of the
1PP in healthy participants and presented evidence for the
involvement of the bilateral posterior superior temporal gyrus
(pSTG) [43]. In addition, direct electrical stimulation of the right
angular gyrus in one patient elicited a complex body illusion
featuring vestibular sensations and changes in body posture
[11]. We speculate that the absence of significant decoding of
self-location in the pSTG and angular gyrus in our study could
be explained by the fact that our paradigm did not involve ma-
nipulations of self-orientation with respect to the gravitational
field. We further speculate that the representations of self-loca-
tion and body ownership characterized in the present study
might interact with vestibular representations of self-orientation
in the pSTG and angular gyrus to represent the full range of
possible positions of one’s body in 3D space with six degrees
of freedom.
In conclusion, this study has shed light on the mechanisms by
which the senses of self-location and body ownership are com-
bined in the human brain to build the coherent experience of be-
ing a body somewhere in space. Our results suggest that an
interconnected set of regions in the hippocampus and the pos-
terior cingulate, retrosplenial, and intraparietal cortices plays
an important role in the construction of this fundamental subjec-
tive feeling of self. The characterization of these neural pro-
cesses lies at the heart of neuroscience and psychology
because the experience of one’s own body and its location in
the environment defines the origin of the egocentric reference
frame that is necessary for human self-consciousness [5, 51]
and our behavioral interactions with the external environment [2].EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Fifteen naive healthy human volunteers (ages 21–33, mean age ± SD = 27 ± 3
years; six females) participated in the study. Informed consent was obtainedCurrent Biology 25, 14prior to the experimental sessions. The Regional Ethical Review Board of
Stockholm approved the study.
Illusion Induction
For induction of the illusory feeling of ownership of the stranger’s body seen
from the 1PP, a white spherical object (6.5 cm in diameter) attached to a
1-m-long wooden stick (Figure 1) repetitively touched the abdomen, right up-
per leg, and left foot of the stranger’s body in the HMDs while the participant
received temporally congruent tactile stimulation on the corresponding body
parts. In the asynchronous control condition, the tactile stimulation was de-
layed by 1 s with respect to the touches of the stranger’s body in the HMDs.
The stereoscopic visual stimuli were presented in a set of MR-compatible
HMDs (Nordic Neurolab). See the Supplemental Experimental Procedures
for details on the experimental setup and the visuotactile stimulation protocols
and Movie S1 for a sample clip from position A.
Illusion Quantification
To quantify the illusion experience, we used three separate psychometric or
psychophysiological measurements. Concurrently with the brain scanning,
we examined SCR evoked by threats directed toward the stranger’s body or
the real body using a MR-compatible SCR-recording module (Brain Products)
[30]. Immediately after the brain scanning, the participants were presented
with additional repetitions of each experimental condition and asked to com-
plete a self-location task and a questionnaire (in two separate sessions) to
quantify the subjective feeling of self-location and body ownership, respec-
tively. For details, see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures.
fMRI
Functional imaging data (voxel size 2 3 2 3 2 mm3) were collected using a
Siemens TIM Trio 3T scanner. For the decoding analyses, the image volumes
were analyzed in native space after standard preprocessing. Within each
participant, we used locally multivariate mapping with support vector machine
classifiers to identify multivoxel patterns [29]. The resulting decoding maps
were spatially normalized to the standard MNI space and entered into a sec-
ond-level analysis, using the Statistical Parametric Mapping software
(SPM8) (for details, see the Supplemental Experimental Procedures). For the
univariate GLM analysis, the image volumes were preprocessed, spatially
normalized, and analyzed with standard procedures using SPM8 (see the Sup-
plemental Experimental Procedures). In all of the fMRI analyses (multivariate
and univariate), we employed a voxel-wise whole-brain approach. First, the
whole-brain activation maps were thresholded at p < 0.005 (uncorrected for
multiple comparisons) and overlaid onto orthogonal sections of the average
structural scan generated from the 15 subjects (Figures 3, 4, and 5). For the
statistical inference, we applied corrections for multiple comparisons within
the appropriate search space for the contrast of interest using the family-
wise error rate correction implemented in SPM8. In areas for which we had
a priori hypotheses, we applied correction for multiple comparisons within
spheres defined around peaks from previous relevant studies on body owner-
ship and spatial cognition (‘‘small-volume correction’’; see the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures). For areas outside the hypothesized regions, we
corrected for multiple comparisons using the whole brain as search space
(however, no such activations were observed). In a purely descriptive manner,
we also report the uncorrected p value for strong activations (p < 0.001, uncor-
rected) that did not survive correction at the whole-brain level (Tables S1–S3).
For all activations, the coordinates of the peak voxel are given in the MNI stan-
dard space (x, y, z).
Eye Tracking
The participants’ eye movements were tracked throughout the experiment to
rule out potential systematic differences in gaze between the conditions that
might confound the results. For details and results, see the Supplemental
Experimental Procedures and Figure S5.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Discussion, Supplemental
Experimental Procedures, five figures, three tables, and one movie and16–1425, June 1, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved 1423
can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cub.2015.
03.059.
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